

Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office

In Re: 18743488 Date: AUG. 10, 2022

Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision

Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Advanced Degree Professional

The Petitioner seeks to employ the Beneficiary as a senior software engineer. It requests classification of the Beneficiary as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree under the second preference immigrant classification. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). This employment-based immigrant classification allows a U.S. employer to sponsor a professional with an advanced degree for lawful permanent resident status.

The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the record did not establish that the Beneficiary meets the experience requirements of the labor certification and, therefore, the Beneficiary is ineligible for the offered position. The Director further entered a finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact against the Petitioner. The matter is now before us on appeal.

In these proceedings, it is the Petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Upon *de novo* review, we will dismiss the appeal.

I. THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRATION PROCESS

Immigration as an advanced degree professional generally follows a three-step process. To permanently fill a position in the United States with a foreign worker, a prospective employer must first obtain certification from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). See section 212(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5). DOL approval signifies that insufficient U.S. workers are able, willing, qualified, and available for a position. *Id.* Labor certification also indicates that the employment of a noncitizen will not harm wages and working conditions of U.S. workers with similar jobs. *Id.*

If DOL approves a position, an employer must next submit the certified labor application with an immigrant visa petition to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). See section 204 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154. Among other things, USCIS considers whether a beneficiary meets the requirements of a certified position and a requested immigrant visa classification. If USCIS approves the petition, a noncitizen may finally apply for an immigrant visa abroad or, if eligible, adjustment of status in the United States. See section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.

The term "advanced degree" is defined in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) as follows:

Advanced degree means any United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above that of baccalaureate. A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree.

The regulations at 8 C.F.R. $\S 204.5(k)(3)(i)$ state that a petition for an advanced degree professional must be accompanied by either:

- (A) An official academic record showing that the alien has a United States advanced degree or a foreign equivalent degree; or
- (B) An official academic record showing that the alien has a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree, and evidence in the form of letters from current or former employer(s) showing that the alien has at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience in the specialty.

In addition, a beneficiary must meet all of the education, training, experience, and other requirements specified on the labor certification as of the petition's priority date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

II. ANALYSIS

As noted above, the Director concluded that the record did not establish that the Beneficiary was qualified for the position, and the Director further "enter[ed] a finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact against the [P]etitioner." We address the issues separately below.

A. Beneficiary Qualifications

Section J.20 of the ETA Form 9089 asserted that the Beneficiary has experience in an alternate occupation, as specified in Section H. Section K of the ETA Form 9089 listed the Beneficiary's work experience as follows:

- From September 1, 2019, through the time of filing in October 2020, the Petitioner employed the Beneficiary as a software engineer, working 40 hours per week;
- From October 1, 2016, through August 31, 2019, the Petitioner employed the Beneficiary as a WebSphere administrator, working 40 hours per week;
- From April 9, 2015, through September 30, 2016 employed the Beneficiary as a software engineer, working 40 hours per week; and
- From June 1, 2012, through December 15, 2012, employed the Beneficiary as a software engineer, working 40 hours per week.

The Director noted in the NOID that Section K does not list any other employment held by the Beneficiary. The Director further noted that the record contains a letter from the human resources manager for stating that it employed the Beneficiary from June 1, 2012, through December 15, 2012, as a software engineer, as reported in Section K. However, the Director noted that a Department of State (DOS) Form DS-160, Nonimmigrant Visa Application, submitted by the Beneficiary on November 6, 2012, stated that the Beneficiary had not been employed prior to submitting the application.

In response to the NOID, the Petitioner asserted that the Beneficiary did not willfully misrepresent a material fact in either the Form DS-160 or the ETA Form 9089, despite the directly conflicting statements therein. The NOID response contained an affidavit from the Beneficiary stating, in relevant part, that the 2012 Form DS-160 "was the first time I was completing the DS-160 form, and I thought I only needed to add my previous education as a requirement to apply for the F-1 student visa. Given that, I overlooked the 'experience' section as I believed it was not relevant for my further studies." The Petitioner asserted that the Beneficiary did not "willfully" misrepresent his employment history on the Form DS-160, as addressed in Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I&N Dec. at 289-90. The Petitioner also submitted an updated letter from the human resources manager for reasserting that it employed the Beneficiary from June 1, 2012, through December 15, 2012, attaching copies of pay statements for the Beneficiary from for the periods of "JUL 2012," "AUG 2012," "SEP 2012," "OCT 2012," "NOV 2012," and for 15 days during "DEC 2012." The pay statements contain identical grammatical and punctuation errors, such as "Computer generated Payslip. No Seal or Signature is required," and "Do you have further questions, please do not hesitate to Contact us info@

In the decision, the Director acknowledged the Beneficiary's assertions regarding his confusion in completing the 2012 Form DS-160; however, the Director noted that the Beneficiary also "did not disclose the information regarding his employment with, in his Forms DS-160 submitted in March 2018, and February 2020." The Director noted that the Forms DS-160 that the Beneficiary submitted in 2018 and 2020 both listed the Beneficiary's work experience as follows:
 From October 1, 2016, through the respective Forms DS-160 filing dates, the Petitioner employed the Beneficiary; and From April 9, 2015, through September 30, 2016, employed the Beneficiary.
In addition to the Beneficiary's three Forms DS-160 omitting any employment by the Director noted that the pay statements submitted in response to the NOID "contain the same abbreviation and grammatical errors, which indicate that they were generated for a different purpose." The Director cited <i>Matter of Ho</i> , 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988), and concluded that, because of the doubt cast on the credibility of the pay statements and the Beneficiary's stated employment history on the ETA Form 9089, the record does not demonstrate that the Beneficiary satisfies the experience requirements provided on the ETA Form 9089.
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the 2018 and 2020 Forms DS-160 also omitted the Beneficiary's employment with because "[the] Beneficiary also completed those forms himself unlike Form 9089, which was accurately completed by his attorney and included the employment with The Petitioner also asserts that the Beneficiary's omission of his employment with on the Forms DS-160:
was not outcome-determinative of his eligibility for visas. Had he included the employment with on any of the DS-160's, there is no possible line of inquiry which would have led to a finding of inadmissibility because prior employment is not a pre-requisite for a student visa and it was not critical for his H-1B applications.
The Petitioner further asserts that, because the Beneficiary's employment with, was not a pre-requisite for a student visa, "there was no material misrepresentation in this case and the omission should be considered harmless error." The Petitioner additionally asserts on appeal that the Director erred by concluding that the statements and evidence regarding the Beneficiary's employment history bears reduced credibility.
On appeal, the Petitioner resubmits the Beneficiary's affidavit submitted in response to the NOID; however, the Petitioner does not submit a new affidavit from the Beneficiary in support of the appeal that may clarify whether he had any assistance with completing the 2018 and 2020 Forms DS-160 and the reason(s) for his repeated omission of employment with

established that the Beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. at 159.

On appeal, the Petitioner also resubmits the photocopies of pay statements bearing grammatical and
punctuation errors, submitted earlier in response to the NOID. In addition to the Director's observation
that the pay statements' grammatical errors reduce their credibility, we also note that the pay
statements reference 2012 and the number of "paid days" per period (either 31, 30, or 15 for "DEC
2012"); however, none of the pay statements indicate the actual pay dates or the dates on which the
pay statements were generated. The pay statements' omission of the dates on which the company paid
the Beneficiary or the dates on which the statements were generated cast doubt on whether they were
actually generated in 2012. See Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591 (providing that doubt cast on any
aspect of a petitioner's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the
remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition). We also note that, despite the Beneficiary's
assertion that he had been employed by from June 1, 2012, through
December 15, 2012, the Petitioner did not submit a pay statement that may correspond to June 2012,
which also raises questions about the Beneficiary's actual period of employment, if any, at that
company. In light of these issues, the pay statements' probative value for establishing whether
employed the Beneficiary in 2012 is further reduced, particularly in the absence
of other, probative, corroborating evidence, and the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence also is reduced. See id.
evidence also is reduced. See id.
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Even if the Petitioner sufficiently clarified the numerous inconsistencies and errors reducing the
reliability and sufficiency of evidence discussed above, the record would not otherwise establish that
the Beneficiary had sufficient experience required by the ETA Form 9089. In support of the petition,
the Petitioner specifically asserted, "It is during [the Beneficiary's] prior employments with
that he gained the required experience with
the skills stipulated on Form ETA9089 [sic] Section H-14," excluding experience during his
employment with the Petitioner. The record contains a letter from the "H R Manager [sic]" of
dated "Aug 27,2020 [sic]," addressed "to whom soever it concern [sic],"
stating that the company employed the Beneficiary "as a [s]oftware [e]ngineer on a full-time basis
from 09th April 2015 to 30th September 2016," a period of 17 months and three weeks. The record
also contains a letter from the "Manager-HR" of "dated July 22, 2020,
addressed "to whom soever [sic] it may concern," stating that the company employed the Beneficiary
"as a [s]oftware [e]ngineer from 01 June, 2012 to 15 December, 2012," a period of six months and
two weeks. Unlike the letter from, the letter from
does not specify whether the Beneficiary worked on a full-time basis. Because the
Petitioner specified that the Beneficiary acquired the experience that would satisfy the ETA Form
9089 requirement through his asserted employment at and
and because his full-time employment at , alone
was less than the 24 months of experience, whether the Beneficiary worked for
on a full-time basis—if at all—is essential for determining whether the Beneficiary met the 24-
month requirement. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A) (requiring a sufficient "description of the
training received or experience").

Petitioners bear the burden to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. In this case, the Petitioner has not met the burden of proving that the Beneficiary

was employed by Accordingly, the Director's conclusion regarding statements regarding the nature and duration of his does not establish that the Beneficiary meets the e See Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. at 1	s employment experience remains, and the record experience requirements of the labor certification.
B. Willful Misrepresentation of a Material Fact	
The Director further concluded in the decision that that he had been employed by whether he is eligible for the benefit requested by the entered the finding of willful misrepresentation of Beneficiary. Therefore, we will withdraw the finding entered against the Petitioner.	, in 2012 was willful, false, and material to he Form I-140. However, the Director mistakenly a material fact against the Petitioner instead of the

III. CONCLUSION

The record does not establish that the Beneficiary meets the experience requirements of the labor certification; therefore, the Beneficiary is ineligible for the offered position.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.